DTIL
name pending profile ingest
Momentum inputs (comparable managers):
holder breadth +25.0% ·
share flow -26.3% ·
net new positions +20.0%
— formula
Ownership fragmentation — more holders, smaller aggregate stake
All ownership figures: tracked 13F managers only, common-stock positions, reporting period Q1 2025
| Quarter | Holders | Δ | Shares | Reported value | New | Exits |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q2 2026 | 49 | +10 | 8.25M | $64.87M | +15 | −5 |
| Q1 2026 | 40 | +9 | 5.84M | $31.37M | +10 | −1 |
| Q4 2025 | 31 | +2 | 5.37M | $22.32M | +2 | — |
| Q3 2025 | 9 | +1 | 1.05M | $5.80M | +1 | — |
| Q2 2025 | 6 | -1 | 663.44K | $2.79M | — | −1 |
| Q1 2025 | 5 | +1 | 257.86K | $1.23M | +2 | −1 |
| Q4 2024 | 4 | -1 | 350.06K | $1.33M | — | −1 |
| Q3 2024 | 4 | +1 | 256.36K | $2.30M | +1 | — |
| Q2 2024 | 3 | — | 227.16K | $2.21M | — | — |
| # | Manager | Shares | Δ shares | Value | Their weight | Held | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Renaissance Technologies ✦ | 82.98K | -24.4% | $395,800 | 0.0% | ▼ Trim | 4 | SEC ↗ |
| 2 | Geode Capital Management ✦ (passive) | 73.69K | +14.2% | $351,527 | 0.0% | ▲ Add | 4 | SEC ↗ |
| 3 | Geode Capital Management ✦ (passive) | 73.69K | +14.2% | $351,527 | 0.0% | ▲ Add | 4 | SEC ↗ |
| 4 | Millennium Management ✦ | 65.59K | New | $312,845 | 0.0% | New | 1 | SEC ↗ |
| 5 | State Street Global Advisors ✦ (passive) | 22.04K | 0.0% | $105,140 | 0.0% | Held | 2 | SEC ↗ |
| 6 | Two Sigma Investments ✦ | 13.56K | New | $64,705 | 0.0% | New | 1 | SEC ↗ |
“Their weight” = the position's share of that manager's reported 13F equity value — the conviction measure. ✦ = curated manager.
New buyers
| Millennium Management | $312,845 | 0.0% |
| Two Sigma Investments | $64,705 | 0.0% |
Exited
| Citadel Advisors | $585,502 | was 0.0% |
Full-market context: across ALL 13F filers (SEC structured data, Q1 2026): 77 holders, 16.15M shares, $87.87M reported. This is a different, older period than the tracked-universe figures above and the two are never mixed.
What else this security's tracked holders most often hold — shared-ownership counts, not fundamental relationships.