DLTR
Dollar Tree, Inc. · Consumer Defensive · Discount Stores
Momentum inputs (comparable managers):
holder breadth -5.6% ·
share flow +17.6% ·
net new positions -5.9%
— formula
Concentrated accumulation — rising shares among fewer holders
All ownership figures: tracked 13F managers only, common-stock positions, reporting period Q4 2024
| Quarter | Holders | Δ | Shares | Reported value | New | Exits |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q2 2026 | 159 | 0 | 145.61M | $17.59B | +4 | −3 |
| Q1 2026 | 161 | +4 | 148.38M | $16.27B | +5 | −2 |
| Q4 2025 | 156 | 0 | 162.75M | $20.02B | +2 | −1 |
| Q3 2025 | 22 | -1 | 96.75M | $9.13B | +1 | −3 |
| Q2 2025 | 21 | -1 | 84.63M | $8.38B | — | −1 |
| Q1 2025 | 19 | +2 | 38.53M | $2.89B | +2 | — |
| Q4 2024 | 17 | -1 | 40.23M | $3.01B | +1 | −2 |
| Q3 2024 | 17 | -2 | 24.88M | $1.75B | +1 | −3 |
| Q2 2024 | 19 | — | 36.91M | $3.94B | — | — |
| # | Manager | Shares | Δ shares | Value | Their weight | Held | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | State Street Global Advisors ✦ (passive) | 9.33M | — | $699.45M | 0.0% | n/c | 1 | SEC ↗ |
| 2 | Geode Capital Management ✦ (passive) | 5.11M | +4.5% | $381.96M | 0.0% | ▲ Add | 3 | SEC ↗ |
| 3 | Geode Capital Management ✦ (passive) | 5.11M | +4.5% | $381.96M | 0.0% | ▲ Add | 3 | SEC ↗ |
| 4 | Marshall Wace ✦ | 4.38M | +784.2% | $328.04M | 0.4% | ▲ Add | 3 | SEC ↗ |
| 5 | Marshall Wace ✦ | 4.38M | +784.2% | $328.04M | 0.4% | ▲ Add | 3 | SEC ↗ |
| 6 | Marshall Wace ✦ | 4.38M | +784.2% | $328.04M | 0.4% | ▲ Add | 3 | SEC ↗ |
| 7 | Marshall Wace ✦ | 4.38M | +784.2% | $328.04M | 0.4% | ▲ Add | 3 | SEC ↗ |
| 8 | D. E. Shaw & Co. ✦ | 4.01M | +152.2% | $300.37M | 0.4% | ▲ Add | 3 | SEC ↗ |
| 9 | D. E. Shaw & Co. ✦ | 4.01M | +152.2% | $300.37M | 0.4% | ▲ Add | 3 | SEC ↗ |
| 10 | PRIMECAP Management ✦ | 3.98M | +31.3% | $298.14M | 0.2% | ▲ Add | 3 | SEC ↗ |
| 11 | T. Rowe Price ✦ | 3.45M | -33.4% | $258.37M | 0.0% | ▼ Trim | 3 | SEC ↗ |
| 12 | T. Rowe Price ✦ | 3.45M | -33.4% | $258.37M | 0.0% | ▼ Trim | 3 | SEC ↗ |
| 13 | Millennium Management ✦ | 2.62M | +338.7% | $196.68M | 0.2% | ▲ Add | 3 | SEC ↗ |
| 14 | Norges Bank ✦ (passive) | 2.28M | -21.6% | $171.15M | 0.0% | ▼ Trim | 3 | SEC ↗ |
| 15 | Citadel Advisors ✦ | 1.98M | -12.0% | $148.05M | 0.1% | ▼ Trim | 3 | SEC ↗ |
| 16 | Citadel Advisors ✦ | 1.98M | -12.0% | $148.05M | 0.1% | ▼ Trim | 3 | SEC ↗ |
| 17 | Point72 Asset Management ✦ | 1.70M | +88.5% | $127.37M | 0.4% | ▲ Add | 3 | SEC ↗ |
| 18 | Two Sigma Investments ✦ | 654.02K | +868.1% | $49.01M | 0.1% | ▲ Add | 3 | SEC ↗ |
| 19 | Renaissance Technologies ✦ | 319.80K | -64.9% | $23.97M | 0.0% | ▼ Trim | 3 | SEC ↗ |
| 20 | Adage Capital Partners ✦ | 188.84K | -0.8% | $14.15M | 0.0% | ▼ Trim | 3 | SEC ↗ |
| 21 | Wellington Management ✦ | 77.89K | +155.7% | $5.84M | 0.0% | ▲ Add | 3 | SEC ↗ |
| 22 | Wellington Management ✦ | 77.89K | +155.7% | $5.84M | 0.0% | ▲ Add | 3 | SEC ↗ |
| 23 | AQR Capital Management ✦ | 64.62K | New | $4.84M | 0.0% | New | 1 | SEC ↗ |
| 24 | AQR Capital Management ✦ | 64.62K | New | $4.84M | 0.0% | New | 1 | SEC ↗ |
| 25 | AQR Capital Management ✦ | 64.62K | New | $4.84M | 0.0% | New | 1 | SEC ↗ |
| 26 | AQR Capital Management ✦ | 64.62K | New | $4.84M | 0.0% | New | 1 | SEC ↗ |
| 27 | Gotham Asset Management ✦ | 44.62K | +72.6% | $3.34M | 0.0% | ▲ Add | 2 | SEC ↗ |
| 28 | Bridgewater Associates ✦ | 37.66K | -34.6% | $2.82M | 0.0% | ▼ Trim | 3 | SEC ↗ |
“Their weight” = the position's share of that manager's reported 13F equity value — the conviction measure. ✦ = curated manager.
New buyers
| AQR Capital Management | $4.84M | 0.0% |
| AQR Capital Management | $4.84M | 0.0% |
| AQR Capital Management | $4.84M | 0.0% |
| AQR Capital Management | $4.84M | 0.0% |
Exited
| Capital World Investors | $111.24M | was 0.0% |
| Arrowstreet Capital | $12.71M | was 0.0% |
Full-market context: across ALL 13F filers (SEC structured data, Q1 2026): 1 holders, 31.90K shares, $3,493 reported. This is a different, older period than the tracked-universe figures above and the two are never mixed.
What else this security's tracked holders most often hold — shared-ownership counts, not fundamental relationships.